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Introduction: Dewey's Influence on Curriculum 
To educationally recover something (or somebody, as the title suggests 
vis-a-vis Dewey) invokes at least two assumptions: (1) that it has been covered 
before, thus, it can be recovered; and (2) that it somehow increases perspec-
tive, insight, or understanding, and is therefore educat ional. Clearly, the 
work of John Dewey permeates the literature of curriculum studies. On numerous 
occasions (Schubert, 1980, 1982a, 1982c, 1986a) I have discussed an experiental-
ist tradition in curriculum discourse that stems from writings of Francis W. 
Parker, William James, and principally John Dewey. It is developed through the 
writings of Boyd Bode, Harold Rugg, George S. Counts, William H. Kilpatrick, 
John Childs, and L. Thomas Hopkins. While the years from 1940 and onward saw 
the deterioration of a Deweyan brand of progressive education (and the demise of 
The Progressive Education Association), I submit that the spirit of the experi-
entalist critique has emerged time and again (often without the progressive 
banner and even without Deweyan citation), challenging conventional theory and 
practice in curriculum. 
Zissis (1987) identifies six recurrent themes in the experientialist 
critique from the late nineteenth century to the present: (1) advocacy of a 
continuous search for the meaning of the good life as opposed to the conven-
tional tendency to establish fixed parameters of the good life and attempt to 
mold students to fit within them; (2) advocacy of the person as a creator of 
knowledge and morality as contrasted with the person as receiver of knowledge 
and moral precept; (3) recognition of knowing as multi-dimensional (a variety of 
legitimate epistemological bases) in contrast to knowing as only a 
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rational/technical process; (4) acceptance of knowledge as an intersubjective 
creation as opposed to knowledge as an objectified entity; (5) characterization 
of educational growth and development as primarily a process of intrinsic rather 
than extrinsic motivation; and (6) acceptance of the need for curricular experi-
ence to be based on participatory democracy instead of autocratic bestowal of 
knowledge or autocracy disguised as representative democracy. 
In addition to the identification of experientialist and progressive themes 
in curriculum discourse throughout this century, it is possible to study the 
widespread acknowledgment of Dewey as a source of curriculum studies. Kliebard 
(1986), for instance, in his recent interpretation of the struggle of ideas and 
practices that forged the American curriculum from 1893 to 1958, recognizes 
Dewey as sufficiently important to be set apart from the contending parties as a 
kind of exemplar and intelligent mediator for all of the groups and individuals 
involved. Sixty years earlier, the all-star team of curriculum scholars 
(William C. Bagley, Franklin Bobbitt, Frederick G. Bonser, Werrett W. Charters, 
George S. Counts, Stuart A. Courtis, Ernest Horn, Charles H. Judd, Frederick J. 
Kelly, William H. Kilpatrick, Harold 0. Rugg, and George A. Works) who comprised 
the committee that authored the second volume of the Twenty-sixth Yearbook of 
the National Society for the Study of Education, The Foundations of Curriculum-
Making (Rugg, 1927), saw fit to conclude their composite statement and individ-
ual rebuttal commentaries with a section of twenty-two pages of quotations 
selected from Dewey's published writings on curriculum. Moreover, the next 
twenty-one pages included quotations from Herbartian scholars on curriculum, 
including additional quotations from Dewey, who is Herbartian only by a stretch 
of the imagination. 
To augment the re in the recovery of Dewey in curriculum, I conducted a 
brief citation analysis of synoptic or general curriculum texts in the 1980s, 
texts used frequently to educate teachers, curriculum leaders, and future schol-
ars about curriculum theory, history, research, and development. Among eleven 
widely used texts published from 1980 to 1986, eight referenced Dewey more than 
or equal to any other author listed in their index. These include: Tanner and 
Tanner (1980), Hass (1987), Unruh and Unruh (1984), McNeil (1985), Miller and 
Seller (1985), Eisner (1985), Doll (1986), and Schubert (1986a). In the other 
three texts surveyed, Dewey was cited third by Wiles and Bondi (1984); second by 
Beane, Tespfer, and Alessi (1986); and among the top ten by Saylor, Alexander, 
and Lewis (1981). Selecting one very prominent text from each decade stretching 
back to the time of the NSSE Twenty-sixth Yearbook, we find Dewey referenced 
fifth by Zais (1976); first by Taba (1962); first by Smith, Stanley, and Shores 
(1950); first by Alberty (1947); and second by Caswell and Campbell (1935), the 
first synoptic curriculum text. Moreover, a 1981 survey (Schubert, Posner, and 
Schubert, 1982) of curriculum scholars reveals that when asked to name scholars 
and books most influential to them and/or authors and books that they would 
recommend to others, curriculum scholars consistently select Dewey among the 
most influential. Likewise, Shane's poll of significant writings that influ-
enced curriculum in this century reveals that Dewey's Democracy and Education 
(1916) and Tyler's Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction (1949) were 
most influential, with several of Dewey's other books also heading the list. 
Similarly, Fraley's (1981) list of curriculum classics, derived from a poll of 
professors of curriculum, finds Dewey as author of five of the twenty-nine 
selected. 
All of this contributes evidence to support the assertion that Dewey has 
been perhaps the most prominent figure in the field of curriculum studies. Why, 
then, should it be necessary or desirable to recover his work? Clearly, Dewey 
is more often identified as a philosopher, a philosopher of education, and a 
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political activist than as a curriculum theorist. His contribution to curricu-
lum was more indirect than direct. This, however, should not be surprising, 
since the curriculum field had not taken distinguishable form until after Dewey 
had completed most of his major works that could be considered curricular in 
character. Dewey's The School and Society (1900), The Child and the Curriculum 
(1902), How We Think (1910), Interest and Effort in Education (1913), and Democ-
racy in Education (1916), as well as Schools for Tomorrow (1915, with Evelyn 
Dewey) were all written before the curriculum field is generally acknowledged to 
have begun. Although at least twenty-four curriculum books can be identified in 
this century prior to 1918, that date is generally noted as the birth date of 
the curriculum field (Schubert, 1980). In 1918 Bobbitt published The Curricu-
lum, the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education of the National 
Education Association published Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education, and 
Kilpatrick published The Project Method. After 1916, Dewey devoted most of his 
scholarly energies to philosophy, although he authored four smaller books on 
education that were indeed highly regarded: The Sources of a Science of Educa-
tion (1929), The Way Out of Educational Confusion (1931), Experience and Educa-
tion (1938), and a collection of previous essays on education, Education Today 
(1940), as well as subsequent editions of pre-1918 books. Despite this later 
writing on education, it seems fair to assert that Dewey was primarily a philos-
opher after 1918, and probably always was. Of course, he wrote directly about 
curriculum on occasion; however, most of his direct influence on the curriculum 
field came through the interpretation of his work by disciples. 
One steeped in the Kuhnian analysis of paradigms of inquiry might see this 
as evidence to support Kuhn's (1962) assertion that paradigm shifts are often 
created by those whose field lies outside the field being influenced. It might 
be claimed, therefore, that Dewey did much to create the new field of curriculum 
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studies precisely because of his great insight into philosophy. One must temper 
such a claim with the realization that Dewey's philosophical work was always 
permeated with his educational ideas. In a large sense he saw education and 
philosophy as inseparable, the study of one having mutually beneficial influence 
on the other. Curriculum for Dewey resides at the heart of education, and deals 
with the most fundamental issues regarding the nature of that which is worth-
while to know and experience. Such fundamental curriculum issues, if taken 
seriously as Dewey advocated, invoke the need to study the deepest assumptions 
about metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, ethics, aesthetics, politics, logic, 
and religion. 
This leads directly to my response to the central topic of this symposium, 
that of recovering Dewey's work, and the need to do so in curriculum. I want to 
argue that the potential for curriculum improvement embodied in the corpus of 
Dewey's work is far from realized in curriculum theory, and most assuredly rare 
in curriculum practice. Therefore, the reason for recovering Dewey is implied 
in the symposium title itself, "Educationally Recovering Dewey"; simply put, the 
reason to recover Dewey is to be educational. Despite the apparent vastness of 
Dewey's influence on education generally, and curriculum in particular, I submit 
that the consequences of his oft-cited work are sorely absent in practice. I 
suggest that this is due to a deep cultural aversion to the most basic values 
embedded in Deweyan curricular philosophy. Most profoundly, the deeply 
ingrained faith in democracy that pervades Dewey's educational theory is simply 
not accepted by the majority of today's professional educators and the public 
generally. The most influential school reform proposals, and most of the 
regional and state reform legislation, contradict the Deweyan position on almost 
every count. The experientialist assumptions (Zissis, 1987) noted earlier 
(personal search for the good life, person as creator, knowing as 
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multi-dimensional, knowledge as intersubjectively constituted, education as 
intrinsic, and participatory democracy) are negated by most of the current 
reform efforts. A deep-seated reason for this state of affairs is that the 
Deweyan position on curriculum severely contradicts dominant assumptions in 
everyday life (namely, that the good life is received, the person is a consumer, 
knowing is unidimensional and rule-bound, knowledge is objectively bestowed, 
education is extrinsic, and the best governance is authoritarianism disguised 
as representative democracy). The Deweyan position has, therefore, been 
expelled from school practice time and time again. 
I wish to point out in the remainder of this paper that Dewey offers a 
largely unrealized and radical departure from conventional assumptions about 
curriculum. So radical is this departure from conventional curricular "wisdom" 
that the pessimist within me wonders if it is possible to actualize the spirit 
of a Deweyan orientation to curriculum on any large scale at all. The optimist 
within me, however, sustains a hope that says a Deweyan orientation and its 
experientialist relatives embody the only promise of authentic curriculum reform 
and the unique brand of specialized knowledge supporting that reform. I will 
organize my comments around the usual subdimensions of curriculum inquiry (see 
Schuber, 1986, pp. 43-46). 
Curriculum Theory 
The realm of curriculum theory and the relation between curriculum theory 
and practice would likely be the realm of the most profound alteration were a 
Deweyan orientation subscribed to a large scale. To use Dewey's language, both 
a logical and psychological response could be derived to the perennial question: 
Is there such a thing as a curriculum theory, and, if so, what would it be like? 
From a logical stance, one that looks first at the disciplines of knowledge, it 
can be argued that if curriculum inquiry genuinely addresses the question of 
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what is worthwhile to know and experience, it then invokes the whole array of 
philosophical assumptions. Attendant questions about the nature of reality, 
human nature, knowledge and knowing, the good life, the just society, defensible 
reason, the beautiful and the sublime all become problematic for the curricu-
larist. In the larger corpus of his philosophical writing Dewey addressed all 
of these questions, and each of his major works could be considered a basis for 
developing a comprehensive curriculum theory. Consider, for example, this 
limited list: 
Perennial Philosophical Categories and Deweyan Sources for Curriculum Theory 
Metaphys ics: 
Nature of reality Experience and Nature (1929a) 
Human nature Human Nature and Conduct (1922) 
Epistemology: 
The continuous search The Quest for Certainty (1929c) 
Dialogue, dialect, 
and transaction Knowing and the Known (with A.F. Bentley, 1949) 
The knowing process How We Think (1910 and 1933) 
Axiology and Ethics: 
Value theory Theory of Valuation (1939) 
Ethics and morality Ethics (with J.H. Tufts, 1908 and 1932) 
Aesthet ics: 
Beauty , Art as Experience (1934) 
Politics: 
Liberty and social creation . . 
The individual and society . . 
Economics, politics, and praxis 
. . . . Freedom and Culture (1939) 
. Individualism Old and New (1930) 
The Public and Its Problems (1927) 
Logic: 
Logic, scientific method, and human 
problem-solving Logic, The Theory of Inquiry (1938b) 
Re 1igion: 
Religiousness of democratic faith A Common Faith (1934) 
This context of Deweyan literature provides philosophic assumptions that 
could constitute a basis for a curriculum theory, and such a theory would be 
logical (derived first from the disciplines of knowledge and developed for 
curricularists). As Dewey might say, it is from the realm of "funded knowl-
edge." Despite the centrality of logically organized funded knowledge in 
Dewey's scheme of things, the use-value of the logical (or funded knowledge) is 
evaluated by its consequences in the world of lived experience. Moreover, I 
suggest that Dewey would argue in theory building, as well as in pedagogy, 
beginning with the psychological and moving to the logical, rather than starting 
with funded knowledge and then focusing on use in application. 
Dewey's use of psychological, as a counterpoint of logical, reveals his 
allegiance to the realm of lived experience. By psychological, he refers not 
only to momentary interest or whim as the starting point of pedagogy, but rather 
sees the momentary interest as symbolic of deeper human interests (Dewey, 1916). 
Such interests are shared in the deep structure of human concern. They reflect 
a fundamental human quest to create personal knowledge and public meaning about 
what Robert Ulich so aptly called "the great mysteries and events of life: 
birth, death, love, tradition, society and the crowd, success and failure, 
salvation, and anxiety" (Ulich, 1955, p. 255). Such fundamental human interests 
are the basis of inquiry itself as well as the key to sound pedagogy. Since 
these experiences are shared among people throughout history, across boundaries 
of race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, age, and class, they are the seedbed of 
d ialogue. 
Dialogue, with its conjoint associated living, is the basis for participa-
tory democracy. Inquiry as the search for personal meaning in a public space is 
the kind of science that Dewey advocated. Democracy and science, so consti-
tuted, are the hallmarks of Dewey's philosophy and the central tenets of his 
theory of education. Of course, during the time of Dewey's major writing, one 
could hardly go wrong by promoting the labels of science and democracy. Anyone 
who has read much beyond the title page of any of Dewey's major works begins to 
realize that Dewey argued for a kind and quality of both democracy and science 
that radically departed from prevailing interpretations. Today, too, Dewey's 
images of science (as the personal and democratic creation of meaning through 
daily problem-solving [Dewey, 1910, 1929b, 1938b]), expressive thought (Dewey, 
1934b), and reverie (1934a), and his images of democracy (as conjoint or cooper-
ative living built on sciences of dialogue, deliberation, and dialectic that 
carefully attend to the consequences of action that flow with inquiry [Dewey, 
1927, 1929b, 1930, 1935, 1939]), depart radically from conventional curriculum 
research, theory, and practice. 
Thus, it is clear that what can be educational about recovering Dewey for 
curriculum is that his notions of science and democracy combine to form a sharp 
critique of the objectified catchwords that those labels have become. This is 
particularly relevant in an era when the promotion of democracy is equated with 
economic supremacy and the conduct of educational science means deification of 
rule-like stands of inquiry that are deemed impervious to values and ideologies. 
The quest for that which is worthwhile and the search for the good life and just 
society implicit in that quest, according to Deweyan orientations to democracy 
and science, clearly situate curriculum theory, as reflective theorizing, in the 
lived worlds of persons and their immediate public spheres. Given this, the 
recovery of Dewey for curriculum would render significant changes in the conven-
tional categories into which curriculum is often subdivided, e.g., curriculum 
theory, curriculum history, curriculum development, curriculum design, curricu-
lum implementation, curriculum evaluation, curriculum change, and curriculum 
inquiry (Schubert, 1986a, pp. 40-43). Let us consider brief illustrations of 
what might happen to these categories (so much a part of curriculum discourse, 
especially the rhetoric of reform) if they were infused with a Deweyan spirit of 
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Curriculum Theory Revisited 
The foregoing section, entitled "Curriculum Theory," began with the sugges-
tion that Deweyan philosophy, writ large, embodies all of the philosophical 
categories necessary to build a comprehensive curriculum theory from a range of 
assumptions. However, the section concluded with an admonition to heed Dewey's 
principle of moving from the psychological to the logical, thus, arguing for a 
reconstitution of curriculum theory away from an abstract guiding construct to a 
process of continuous reflection or theorizing about (and in) the course of 
action. This image of curriculum theory creates havoc with managerial curricu-
lum administrators who envision a theory as a set of rules for action that can 
be plugged in for the purpose of resolving prespecified dilemmas. Even the 
notion of a comprehensive theory as a set of assumptions derived from Deweyan 
philosophy would be an anathema to the 'plug-in' interest because it requires 
considerable scholarly inquiry, and, in Deweyan spirit, it is open-ended, i.e., 
the tenets of Deweyan philosophy are indicators of direction for further inquiry 
which only becomes concrete through the exercise of intelligence in specific 
contexts with particular problems in question. 
There is a real sense, then, in which the situation-based curriculum 
inquirer is a highly appropriate developer of curriculum theories, i.e., 
teachers and even students can be seen as developers of theory to guide their 
search for worthwhile knowledge, meaningful experiences, the good life, and the 
just society. In fact, the evolving perspectives of teachers and students who 
seriously engage this search actually may be considered to be continuously 
reconstructed curriculum theories. Thus, the pedagogical transaction of 
teachers and students that moves in Deweyan fashion from the psychological to 
the logical is, itself, theory development (Schubert, 1982b). The movement from 
the psychological to the logical, sometimes called Dewey's progressive theory of 
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curriculum organization, involves inquiry that is raicrocosraic of the whole range 
of dimensions of Deweyan philosophy. 
Curriculum History 
In addition to the usual topics in the history of educational ideas and 
practice—and the history of the curriculum field itself—the situational and 
contextual nature of curriculum development by teachers and students invokes new 
images of curriculum history. Such history would focus directly on teachers, 
not so much on their behaviors but on the ways in which they reflect on curricu-
lum matters, namely, on the way teachers deal with the problem of developing 
worthwhile experiences. Traver (1987) criticizes the corpus of extant research 
on teaching presented in The Handbook of Research on Teaching (Wittrock, 1986) 
for the major omission of the perspectives of teachers themselves. Traver 
(1987) calls for an "autobiographical" approach to study teachers using first 
person accounts of their work. In the curriculum literature, Berk (1980) illus-
trates a biographic approach to curriculum history; Pinar and Grumet (1976) and 
Pinar (1980 and 1981) exemplify autobiographical method; and Connelly and Elbaz 
(1980), Elbaz (1983), Connelly and Clandinin (1985), Munby (1982), Clandinin 
(1986), Butt (1986), and Oberg (1987) focus on the personal and practical 
reflection of teachers in the process of developing curricula. Some inquiry 
into teaching points in a similar direction: Connell's (1985) critical analysis 
of teachers' work; Stenhouse's development of teacher-as-researcher approaches 
(Rudduck and Hopkins, 1985); an interpretation of teachers' worlds and work in 
light of school improvement literature by Lieberman and Miller (1984); Goodson's 
(1985) collection of perspectives on teachers' lives and careers and Sikes' 
(1985) treatment of the same topic; a study of teachers' sense of efficacy and 
the difference it makes in student achievement by Ashton and Webb (1986); and 
first person accounts by some who have contributed to autobiographical 
literature on teaching since the 1960s (e.g., Herndon, 1985; Kohl, 1984). The 
first-person literature to which I refer often has a counter-culture flavor, 
especially in opposition to the dominant culture of schooling; primary exemplars 
include John Holt, Herb Kohl, George Dennison, James Herndon, Sylvia Ashton-
Warner, and Jonathan Kozol, among others. 
The point of all this is that there is a great deal of curriculum history 
to be excavated within the experiential repertoires of teachers. The Deweyan 
emphasis on teachers and students as curriculum makers who continuously move 
through phases from the psychological to logical necessitates taking a much more 
serious look at the values, beliefs, and experientially derived principles that 
guide teachers' reflective efforts to enable students to engage in worthwhile 
endeavors. During the past year, I have begun to direct a research project in 
the Chicago area called The Teacher Lore Project (Schubert, 1987), which has as 
its purpose the accumulation of audio tapes of teachers talking about values, 
beliefs, and principles that guide their work. It is hoped that the 
interpretations and analyses that result from such study will provide the 
seedbed for a neglected dimension of both curriculum history and curriculum 
theory. 
Curriculum Development 
Curriculum development, as revealed in classic curriculum texts of each 
decade for the past fifty years (e.g., Caswell and Campbell, 1935; Stratemeyer, 
Forkner, Mckim, and Passow, 1947 and 1957; Smith, Stanley, and Shores, 1950 and 
1957; Taba, 1962; and Tanner and Tanner, 1975 and 1980), has usually drawn 
heavily upon Dewey. While authors of such texts often remind readers of the 
centrality of teachers and students to the curriculum development process, this 
advice is often read by administrators as guidelines for management. In con-
trast to mounting guidelines and mandates from state departments, school boards, 
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and central office administrators, the Deweyan origins of these authors of 
curriculum development texts still can be seen today in their emphasis on 
diagnosis of situational needs and interests in the context of the classroom, 
and on the advocacy of scientific and democratic problem-solving as a basis of 
continuous reconstruction of the curriculum by those who live there, viz., 
teachers and students. 
Despite this intent, however, as curriculum development literature grew 
throughout this century, teachers and students were increasingly pushed to the 
sidelines, more specifically to roles of receivers. Curriculum leaders in 
school districts were staff and line administrators whose purpose was to develop 
curriculum for teacher use, for teachers to follow. Curriculum development 
became managerial in character; note, for example, recent illustrative titles of 
endeavors to re-educate curriculum workers: books by Glatthorn, Curriculum 
Leadership (1987); English, Improving Curriculum Management in the Schools 
(1980); and institutes and workshops by organizations such as ASCD and private 
consulting firms that focus on the management and leadership aspects of 
curriculum development. 
In contrast, a Deweyan emphasis for curriculum development would see 
teachers and students (those most directly involved in the teaching-learning 
situation) as the principal architects of curriculum. Together, they would 
address the fundamental curriculum question: What knowledge and experience are 
most worthwhile in given situations? Together, too, they would work out the 
human transactions necessary to pursue their continuously evolving sense of 
meaning and direction. 
Curriculum Design 
Curriculum development usually deals with the larger domain of orchestrat-
ing human and material resources to further an educational philosophy, as well 
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as the typical notion of curriculum design which involves specific decisions 
about how to realize the aims and purposes articulated. While Walker (1971) and 
others point out that this involves a considerable amount of political inter-
action, curriculum design most frequently focuses on particular characteristics 
of decision regarding such Tylerian (Tyler, 1949) matters as purposes, learning 
experiences, organization (scope, sequence, environment, instructional strate-
gies, etc.), and evaluation. Decision about these matters is conventionally 
assumed to occur prior to and apart from the teaching-learning situation. Dewey 
(1938a) argued that this is (to invoke Abraham Lincoln's well-known image of 
democracy "of, by, and for the people") to have a curriculum for the students 
without being erf or Jby them (Schubert and Schubert, 1981; Melnick, 1987). 
Dewey's democratic image of education concurs, again contending that the process 
of determining how to pursue one's sense of meaning and direction is as central 
to educational development as particular content studied. As with curriculum 
development, Dewey would see design as a quality of the mind and of life lived 
more than as characteristics of curriculum materials, texts, computer software, 
and other predesigned instructional packages. 
Curriculum Implementation 
The most prevalent notion of implementat ion is that of carrying out some-
thing designed beforehand. Often this invokes a treatment specification and 
verification model in which curriculum policy is spelled out in advance, perhaps 
after conducting a highly structured needs analysis. Implementation is 
considered successful if it can be verified by mapping on the original prespeci-
fications or goals. In their study of implementation of political policy, 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1979) point out a contrasting view—one much more 
compatible with Dewey's position than the highly mechanistic treatment 
specification-verification model. They suggest that policy be conceived as 
disposition and implementation of evolution which is consonant with Dewey s 
characterization of education as "that reconstruction or reorganization of 
experience which adds to meaning of experience and which increases ability to 
direct the course of subsequent experience" (Dewey, 1916, p. 76). Education is 
not something set out in advance to be obtained later. Rather, it is a continu-
ous process of reconstructing one's perspective and the consequences of acting 
on that perspective. Clearly, the perspective provides disposition about what 
is worthwhile, but action (i.e., implementation) based on that disposition must 
be encouraged to evolve in view of the continuous monitoring of consequences. 
Curriculum Evaluation 
Evaluation, revised according to Dewey, flows directly from consideration 
of implementation. Formative evaluation, in the treatment specification-
verification model involves periodic monitoring of implementation to determine 
if it is keeping on the predetermined track. If it is not on track, it is put 
back on track (track being defined by prespecification). In a Deweyan orienta-
tion (one that along with Pressman and Wildavsky [1979] sees policy—disposition 
and implementation—as evolution), formative evaluation continuously assesses 
the value of the initial disposition in light of circumstances that were not 
foreseen in advance or could not have been foreseen because situations have 
changed. Thus, instead of returning practice to a predetermined track, the 
Deweyan orientation trusts practitioners sufficiently to encourage ongoing 
improvement of the track itself. This trust manifests itself even in the case 
of summative evaluation. The individuals and groups of individuals most fully 
influenced by a policy, course of action, or curriculum are precisely those who 
are deemed most capable of assessing its impact on their lives. This, of 
course, does not rule out assessment by experts who possess specialized knowl-
edge. However, it is those who live under the influence of the curriculum in 
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question who should decide when and whether to consult the experts rather than 
merely use evaluation determined and conducted by outside experts who are deemed 
more capable, more insightful, and more wise than those who live and create the 
curriculum, namely, teachers and students. 
Curriculum Change 
Curriculum change is not desirable unless it can be justified as improve-
ment. Change for its own sake, or for the sake of public relations, is a long 
story in curriculum. In large part, it is, as Apple ( 1987) and others have 
shown, a story of de-skilling the profession of teaching. Purposes are 
generated in one setting by one group of curricularists, evaluation is conceived 
and conducted by another set of curricularists, and teachers and students are 
merely expected to follow orders of the former and submit to the judgment of the 
latter. 
The professional fulfillment of teaching that includes conception of an 
individual teacher's work, followed by execution and self-evaluation, is sacri-
ficed in the interest of specialized division of labor. In the process, curric-
ulum change loses its sense of wholeness that can only be provided by the 
teacher. In her analysis of what she calls the "wonderland" of educational 
reform, Cross (1987) declares that "teachers must be actively involved in the 
process of teaching. They cannot be following someone else's dicta" (p. 500). 
She continues, "If teaching is a profession in which it is possible to grow and 
develop, then teachers are learners" (p. 501). Much of the curriculum reform 
movement of the 1980s has apparently learned nothing from mistakes in reform 
efforts of the post-Sputnik era. To wit, state departments and the multitude of 
"blue ribbon commissions" on educational reform rarely consult teachers about 
what should be done, how it might be evaluated, and/or what they have learned 
from their experience in classrooms. Change that purports to be improvement 
must be guided by continuous reflectiveness, an art that Schon has convincingly 
argued is well known to first-rate practitioners across professional fields 
(Schon, 1983). In a more recent work, Schon offers means by which the arts of 
reflection can be enhanced through professional education (Schon, 1987). 
Parallels to Dewey are legion, as his portrayal of reflective inquiry is well-
known (Dewey, 1910, 1938b). 
Curriculum Inquiry 
A Deweyan emphasis on curriculum inquiry moves into sharp relief the role 
of teachers in curriculum inquiry. At the same time, it does not diminish the 
involvement of curriculum scholars, curriculum leaders in school districts, 
relevant government officials, or building principals. It simply puts all of 
them in perspective with teachers. Stenhouse (1975, also Rudduck and Hopkins, 
1985) does this in his work on teacher-as-researcher. The work of Carr and 
Kemmis (1986) which extends Stenhouse-1ike perspectives in the tradition of 
action research (Miel, 1946; Corey, 1953) and adds to it an awareness that 
enables teachers to become critical (e.g., Bullough, Goldstein, and Holt, 1984; 
Connell, 1985; Giroux and McClarin, 1986; Lather, 1986; and Apple and Weis, 
1983). Similarly, the educational criticism of Eisner (1985abc), Barone (1983), 
and McCutcheon (1981) adds to the acuteness of perception that researchers, 
curriculum leaders, and teachers can have when they inquire together to inter-
pret and understand educational situations. The necessary salience of students 
as well as teachers in the process of curriculum inquiry is clear in Dewey's 
conclusion to The Sources of a Science of Education (Dewey, 1929): 
The sources of an educational science are any portions of ascertained 
knowledge that enter into the heart, head, and hands of educators, and 
which, by entering in, render the performance of the educational 
function more enlightened, more humane, more truly educational than it 
was before. But there is no way to discover what is "more truly 
educational" except by the continuation of the educational act 
itself . . . Education is by its nature an endless circle or spiral. 
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It is an activity which includes science within itself. In this very 
process it sets more problems to be further studied, which then react 
into the educative process to change it still further, and thus demand 
more thought, more science, and so on, in everlasting sequence. 
[Dewey, 1929, pp. 76-77.] 
Conclusion 
According to Dewey's orientation, that which should be recovered for 
curriculum is clearly not a recipe. It is a spirit of inquiry, in the sense of 
Montesquieu's distinction between the spirit and the letter of the law. Thus, 
if Dewey may not have embraced certain issues or ideas fully enough (which he 
would doubtless be the first to admit), we should turn to those who continue the 
quest. For example, if his image of deliberation could be sharpened, we might 
turn to Schwab (1969, 1970, 1971, 1973, 1983) on practical curriculum inquiry; 
if Dewey could not have anticipated the repercussions wrought by post-industrial 
capitalism for democracy, we might turn to the work of Apple (1982), Aronowitz 
and Giroux (1985), or Shor and Freire (1987); if his image of the good life 
seems to stop short, we might turn to Alasdair Maclntyre (1981), Iris Murdock 
(1970), or Eliseo Vivas (1950); if we think that Dewey did not turn inward to 
the phenomenology of teaching thoroughly enough, we might turn to van Manen 
(1986) or Langevelt (1983); if we deem Dewey's reliance on science too confin-
ing, we could turn to claims that curriculum insight can derive from critical 
and interpretive philosophy as well as the empirical and analytic (Feinberg, 
1983), a literary rendition (Greene, 1973 and 1978), intuition (Noddings and 
Shore, 1984), a feminist ethic of caring (Noddings, 1984), and a range of other 
epistemological bases (Eisner, 1985c; Haggerson, 1986; Phenix, 1964; Rubin, 
1984; Willis, 1978); if we wish Dewey would have elaborated more on the nature 
of communicative competence, we could study Habermas (1984) and Bowers (1984); 
if we think that Dewey did not emphasize religious dimensions of curriculum and 
pedagogy sufficiently, we could turn to Foshay (1985) on peak spiritual 
experiences, Macdonald (1981) on curriculum theorizing as an act of faith and a 
prayerful act, and Huebner (1984) on religious metaphors in curriculum language; 
if we estimate that Dewey does not give sufficient attention to the role of 
nonschool educative environments, we could turn to those who advocate sources 
that see curriculum as permeating a whole configuration of school and nonschool 
organizations and arrangements in students' lives (e.g., Cremin, 1976; Schubert, 
1981; Fantini and Sinclair, 1985); and if we think that Dewey could not have 
predicted the range of contemporary social issues that bear on curriculum and 
education generally, we could turn to portrayals by Molnar (1987) and by Stevens 
and Wood (1987). 
In all of the above, it is of central importance to remember the pivotal 
focus that Dewey gives to the exercise of intelligence by all those involved in 
any situation in question. This point clearly implies that students as well as 
teachers should continuously conduct inquiry into that which is worthwhile for 
their lives and for the consequences of their lives, i.e., they should engage in 
curriculum inquiry. This is implicit, as well, in Dewey's image of democracy 
sketched earlier. Those who think Dewey did not provide enough practical exam-
ples of his theory in action, beyond the University of Chicago Laboratory 
School, might turn to the work of the Institute for Democratic Education ini-
tiated by George Wood at Ohio University which is described in the following 
essay. Moreover, the notion that teachers and students can be conceived as 
primary curriculum inquirers is corroborated in a review of Torbert (1981) and 
related sources by Short (1985), who describes it as a view that "research and 
action are inextricably intertwined in practice" (p. 72-73), and it is supported 
in research by Brimfield, Roderick, and Yamamoto (1983) that portrays persons as 
researchers in the observations of participants. Herein, then, lies the essence 
of a Deweyan recovery of curriculum—a recovery of fundamental questioning about 
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what is worthwhile in the lives of teachers and students, who together engage in 
the continuous reconstruction of their lives through the experience of democracy 
in education. 
My central point is that Dewey offers a specialized understanding of 
curriculum that is quite different from the usual image of specialized knowledge 
as the results of research in social and behavioral sciences. In fact, what 
Dewey calls "a technical definition of education" (as noted earlier as "that 
reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of 
experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent 
experience"—Dewey, 1916, p. 76) is especially telling when coupled with his 
conclusion about educational science, viz., that "education . . . is an activity 
which includes science within itself" (Dewey, 1929, p. 77). If educational 
science (or inquiry) is within education, and if curriculum (as the progressive 
organization of subject matter) pervades education, it seems reasonable that 
educational science is, in fact, the moving force that enables curriculum to 
proceed from the psychological to the logical (i.e., from momentary interest or 
concern, to fundamental human interests through democratic transactions, and to 
perceiving valuable insight that speaks to those interests through available 
funded knowledge). 
Thus, to educationally recover Dewey in curriculum would be to realize that 
engagement in the progressive organization of curriculum is to do curriculum 
inquiry. Therefore, if we search for exemplary curriculum inquiry, we should 
look to teaching-learning situations where teachers and learners cooperate to 
discover greater worth, meaning, and direction for their lives, and for the 
consequences of their lives. There, the educational recovery of Dewey for 
curriculum can be found as well, and probably not in reform mandates conceived 
by persons who know little of the lives of those who are supposed to implement 
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them. It is only when teachers and students, themselves, address fundamental 
curriculum questions about worthwhile knowledge and experience, about meaning 
and direction in their lives, about assessing the consequences of their lives, 
and about how to contribute to a good and just world, that a Deweyan orientation 
to curriculum can be developed.* 
*To borrow the title of what may be the first visually appealing new journal in 
education (Teaching Education, edited by Craig Kridel), Dewey can be educa-
tionally recovered in curriculum when curriculum becomes "teaching education." 
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